We present a new constant round protocol for non-malleable zero-knowledge. Using this protocol as a subroutine, we obtain a new constant-round protocol for non-malleable commitments. Our constructions rely on the existence of (standard) collision resistant hash functions. Previous constructions either relied on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision resistant against subexponential sized circuits, or required a super-constant number of rounds. Additional results are the first construction of a non-malleable commitment scheme that is statistically hiding (with respect to opening), and the first non-malleable protocols that satisfy a strict polynomial-time simulation requirement. The latter are constructed by additionally assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the execution of two-party protocols in the presence of an adversary that has full control of the communication channel between the parties. The adversary has the power to omit, insert or modify messages at its choice. It has also full control over the scheduling of the messages. The honest parties are not necessarily aware to the existence of the adversary, and are not allowed to use any kind of trusted set-up (such as a common reference string).
The above kind of attack is often referred to as a manin-the-middle attack. It models a natural scenario whose investigation is well motivated. Protocols that retain their security properties in face of a man-in-the-middle are said to be non-malleable [11] . Due to the hostile environment in which they operate, the design and analysis of non-malleable protocols is a notoriously difficult task. The task becomes even more challenging if the honest parties are not allowed to use any kind of trusted set-up. Indeed, only a handful of such protocols have been constructed so far.
The rigorous treatment of two-party protocols in the manin-the-middle setting has been initiated in the seminal paper by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [11] . The paper contains definitions of security for the tasks of non-malleable commitment and non-malleable zero-knowledge. It also presents protocols that meet these definitions. The protocols rely on the existence of one-way functions, and require O(log n) rounds of interaction, where n ∈ N is a security parameter.
A more recent result by Barak presents constant-round protocols for non-malleable commitment and non-malleable zero-knowledge [2] . This is achieved by constructing a cointossing protocol that is secure against a man in the middle, and then using the outcome of this protocol to instantiate known constructions for non-malleable commitment and zero-knowledge in the common reference string model (see Section 1.3). The proof of security makes use of non blackbox techniques and is highly complex. It relies on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision-resistant against sub-exponential sized circuits.
In this paper we continue the line of research initiated by the above papers. We will be interested in the construction of new constant-round protocols for non-malleable commitment and non-malleable zero-knowledge. Similarly to the above works, we will refrain from relying on any kind of set-up assumption.
Non-Malleable Protocols
In accordance with the above discussion, consider a manin-the-middle adversary A that is simultaneously participat-ing in two executions of a two-party protocol. These executions are called the left and the right interaction. Besides controlling the messages that it sends in the left and right interactions, A has control over the scheduling of the messages. In particular, it may delay the transmission of a message in one interaction until it receives a message (or even multiple messages) in the other interaction.
The adversary is trying to take advantage of its participation in the left interaction in order to violate the security of the protocol executed in the right interaction, where the exact interpretation of the term "violate the security" depends on the specific task at hand. A two-party protocol is said to be non-malleable if the left interaction does not "help" the adversary in violating the security of the right interaction. Following the simulation paradigm [19, 20, 17, 18] , this is formalized by defining appropriate "real" and "idealized" executions.
In the real execution, called the man-in-the-middle execution, the adversary participates in both the left and the right interactions. In the idealized execution, called the standalone execution, the adversary is only participating in a single interaction. Security is defined by requiring that the adversary cannot succeed better in the man-in-the middle execution than he could have done in the stand-alone execution. In the specific instances of zero-knowledge and string commitment, the definition of security takes the following forms (detailed definitions can be found in Section 2).
Non-malleable zero-knowledge. [11] Let P, V be an interactive proof system (and see Figure 1 .a). In the left interaction the adversary A is verifying the validity of a statement x by interacting with an honest prover P . In the right interaction A proves the validity of a statement x = x to the honest verifier V . The objective of the adversary is to convince the verifier in the right interaction that x ∈ L. Non-malleability of P, V is defined by requiring that for any man-in-the-middle adversary A, there exists a stand-alone prover S that manages to convince the verifier with essentially the same probability as A. The interactive proof P, V is said to be non-malleable zero-knowledge if it is non-malleable and (stand-alone) zero-knowledge.
Non-malleable commitments. [11] . Let C, R be a commitment scheme (and see Figure 1 .b). In the left interactions the adversary A is receiving a commitment to a value v from the committer C. In the right interaction A is sending a commitment to a valueṽ to the receiver R. The objective of the adversary is to succeed in committing in the right interaction to a valueṽ = v that satisfies R(v,ṽ) = 1 for some polynomial-time computable relation R. Non-malleability of C, R is defined by requiring that for any man-in-themiddle adversary A, there exists a stand-alone committer S that manages to commit to the relatedṽ with essentially the same probability as A.
Schemes that satisfy the above definition are said to be non-malleable with respect to commitment. In a different variant, called non-malleable commitment with respect to opening [14] , the adversary is considered to have succeeded only if it manages to decommit to a related valueṽ.
Our Results
Our main result is the construction of a new constantround protocol for non-malleable ZK. The proof of security relies on the existence of (ordinary) collision resistant hash functions and does not rely on any set-up assumption.
Theorem 1 (Non-malleable ZK) Suppose that there exists a family of collision resistant hash functions. Then, there exists a constant-round non-malleable ZK argument for every L ∈ N P.
Using our non-malleable ZK protocol as a subroutine, we construct constant round protocols for non-malleable string commitment. One of our constructions achieves statistically binding commitments that are non-malleable w.r.t. commitment, and the other achieves statistically hiding commitments that are non-malleable w.r.t. opening.
Theorem 2 (Statistically binding non-malleable commitment) Suppose that there exists a family of collisionresistant hash functions. Then, there exists a constant-round statistically binding commitment scheme that is non malleable with respect to commitment.
Theorem 3 (Statistically hiding non-malleable commitment) Suppose that there exists a family of collisionresistant hash functions. Then, there exists a constant-round statistically hiding commitment scheme that is non malleable with respect to opening.
Underlying cryptographic assumptions. The main quantitative improvement of our construction over the constant round protocols in [2] is in the underlying cryptographic assumption. Our constructions rely on the existence of ordinary collision resistant hash functions. The protocols in [2] relied on the existence of both trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision resistant against sub exponential sized circuits. The constructions in [11] assumed only the existence of one-way functions, but had a superconstant number of rounds.
Statistically hiding non-malleable commitments. Theorem 3 gives the first construction of a non-malleable commitment scheme that is statistically hiding and that does not rely on set-up assumptions. We mention that the existence of collision resistant hash functions is the weakest assumption currently known to imply constant round statistically hiding commitment schemes (even those that are not of the non-malleable kind) [27, 7] .
Strict vs. liberal non-malleability. The notion of non malleability that has been considered so far in all works (including the current one), allows the stand alone adversary S to run in expected polynomial time. A stronger ("tighter") notion of security, named strict non-malleability [11] , requires S to run in strict polynomial time. By additionally assuming the existence of trapdoor permutations, we are able to construct the first protocols that are strictly non-malleable.
Theorem 4 (Strict non-malleability) Suppose that there exists a family of collision resistant hash functions. Further suppose that there exist a family of trapdoor permutations. Then,
1. There exists a constant-round strictly non-malleable ZK argument for every L ∈ N P.
2. There exists a constant round statistically hiding commitment scheme that is strictly non-malleable with respect to opening.
Techniques. Our protocols rely on non black-box techniques used by Barak to obtain constant-round public-coin ZK argument for N P [1] (in a setting where no man in the middle is considered). They are closely related to previous works by Pass [29] , and Pass and Rosen [30] that appeared in the context of bounded-concurrent two-party and multiparty computation. Our techniques are different than the ones used by Barak in the context of non-malleable cointossing [2] . The approach we follow in this work is fundamentally different than the approach used in [11] . Instead of viewing non-malleable commitments as a tool for constructing nonmalleable ZK protocols, we reverse the roles and use nonmalleable ZK protocols in order to construct non-malleable commitments. Our approach is also different from the one taken by [2] , who uses a coin-tossing protocol to instantiate constructions that rely on the existence of a common reference string.
Additional contributions. Our approach gives rise to a modular and natural construction of non-malleable commitments. This construction emphasizes the role of nonmalleable ZK as a building block for other non-malleable cryptographic primitives. In principle, our definitions of non-malleability are compatible with the ones appearing in [11] . However, the presentation is more detailed and somewhat different (see Section 2). Our definitional approach, as well as our construction of non-malleable ZK highlights a potential distinction between the notions of nonmalleable interactive proofs and non-malleable ZK. This distinction was not present in the definitions given in [11] .
Related Work
Assuming the existence of a common random string, Di Crescenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky [10] , and Di Crescenzo, Katz, Ostrovski, and Smith [9] construct non-malleable commitment schemes. Sahai [31] , and De Santis, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovski, Persiano and Sahai [8] construct a non-interactive non-malleable ZK protocol under the same assumption. Fischlin and Fischlin [14] , and Damgård and Groth [6] construct non-malleable commitments assuming the existence of a common reference string. We note that the non-malleable commitments constructed in [10] and [14] only satisfy nonmalleability with respect to opening [14] . Canetti and Fischlin [5] construct a universally composable commitment assuming a common random string. Universal composability implies non malleability. However, it is impossible to construct universally composable commitments without making set-up assumptions [5] .
Goldreich and Lindell [16] , and Nguyen and Vadhan [28] consider the task of session-key generation in a setting where the honest parties share a password that is taken from a relatively small dictionary. Their protocols are designed having a man-in-the-middle adversary in mind, and only requires the usage of a "mild" set-up assumption (namely the existence of a "short" password).
Future Work
Our constructions (and even more so the previous ones) are quite complex. A natural question is whether they can be simplified. A somewhat related question is whether nonblack box techniques are necessary for achieving constantround non-malleable ZK or commitments. Our constructions rely on the existence of collision resistant hash functions, whereas the non constant-round construction in [11] relies on the existence of one-way functions. We wonder whether the collision resistance assumption can be relaxed.
Another interesting question is whether it is possible to achieve non-malleability under concurrent executions. The techniques used in this paper do not seem to extend to the (unbounded) concurrent case and new ideas seem to be required. Advances in that direction might shed light on the issue of concurrent composition of general secure protocols.
DEFINITIONS
The notion of non-malleability was introduced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [11] . In this paper we focus on non malleability of interactive proofs and string commitment. The definition of interactive proofs extends in a natural way to notions of non-malleable zero-knowledge and proofs of knowledge (by additionally requiring the zero-knowledge and proof of knowledge properties from a non-malleable interactive proof). In principle, our definitions are compatible with the ones appearing in [11] . However, the presentation is more detailed and somewhat different.
Non-Malleable Interactive Proofs
Let P, V be an interactive proof. Consider a scenario where a man-in-the-middle adversary A is simultaneously participating in two interactions. These interactions are called the left and the right interaction. In the left interaction the adversary A is verifying the validity of a statement x by interacting with an honest prover P . In the right interaction A proves the validity of a statementx to the honest verifier V (see Figure 1 .a). As discussed in Section 1.1, A has control over the scheduling of the messages. We consider two types of executions.
Man-in-the-middle execution. The man-in-the-middle consists of the scenario described above. The input of P is an instance-witness pair (x, w), and the input of V is the instancex. A receives both x,x and an auxiliary input z. Let mim A V (x,x, w, z) be a random variable describing the the output of V in the above experiment when the random tapes of P, A and V are uniformly and independently chosen.
Stand-alone execution. In the stand-alone execution only one interaction takes place. The stand-alone adversary S directly interacts with the honest verifier V . As in the man-in-the-middle execution, V receives as input an instancex. S receives instances x,x and auxiliary input z. Let sta S V (x,x, z) be a random variable describing the the output of V in the above experiment when the random tapes of S and V are uniformly and independently chosen. Definition 2.1. An interactive proof P, V for a language L is said to be non-malleable if for every probabilistic polynomial time man-in-the-middle adversary A, there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial time stand-alone prover S and a negligible function ν : N → N , such that for every
|x| so thatx = x, and every z ∈ {0, 1} * :
Note that the above-defined notion refers to interactiveproofs that are non-malleable with respect to themselves, since the definition considers a setting where the same protocol is executed in the left and the right interaction. In principle, one could consider two different protocols that are executed on the left and on the right which are be nonmalleable with respect to each other.
Non-malleability with respect to tags. Definition 2.1 rules out the possibility that the statement proved on the right interaction is identical to the one on the left. Indeed, if the same protocol is executed on the left and on the right this kind of attack cannot be prevented, as the man-in-themiddle adversary can always copy messages between the two executions (c.f., the chess-master problem [11] ). In many situations it is, nevertheless, important to be protected against an attacker that attempts to prove even same statement. In order to deal with this problem, one might instead consider a "tag-based" variant of non-malleability.
We consider a family of interactive proofs, where each member of the family is labelled with a tag string tag ∈ {0, 1} m , and m = m(n) is a parameter that potentially depends on the length of the common input (security parameter) n ∈ N . As before, we consider a scenario where a man-in-the-middle adversary A is simultaneously participating in a left and a right interaction. In the left interaction, A is verifying the validity of a statement x by interacting with an honest prover P while using a protocol that is labelled with a string tag. In the right interaction A proves the validity of a statementx to the honest verifier V while using a protocol that is labelled with a stringt ag.
Similarly to Definition 2.1, non-malleability with respect to tags is formalized by considering a man-in-the-middle and a stand-alone execution. The only difference in the definitions is that instead of requiring non-malleability whenever x =x, we will require non-malleability whenever tag =t ag.
Tags vs. statements. A non-malleable interactive proof can be turned into a tag-based one by simply concatenating the tag to the statement being proved. On the other hand, an interactive proof that is non-malleable with respect to tags of length m(n) = n can be turned into a non-malleable interactive proof by using the statement x ∈ {0, 1} n as tag. The problem of constructing a tag-based non-malleable interactive proof is already non-trivial for tags of length, say m(n) = O(log n) (and even for m(n) = O(1)), but is still potentially easier than for tags of length n. This opens up the possibility of reducing the construction of interactive proofs that are non-malleable w.r.t. long tags into interactive proofs that are non-malleable w.r.t. shorter tags. Even though we do not know whether such a reduction is possible in general, our work follows this path and demonstrates that in specific cases such a reduction is indeed possible.
Non-malleable Commitments
We proceed to give a definition of non-malleable commitments. Informally, a commitment scheme is non-malleable if a man-in-the-middle adversary that receives a commitment to a value v will not be able to "successfully" commit to a related valueṽ. The literature discusses two different interpretations of the term"success":
Non-malleability with respect to commitment [11] .
The adversary is said to succeed if it manages to commit to a related value, even without being able to later decommit to this value. This notion makes sense only in the case of statistically-binding commitments.
Non-malleability with respect to opening [10] . The adversary is said to succeed only if it is able to both commit and decommit to a related value. This notion makes sense both in the case of statistically-binding and statistically-hiding commitments.
As in the case of non-malleable interactive proofs, we formalize the definition by comparing a man-in-the-middle and a stand-alone execution. Let n ∈ N be a security parameter. Let C, R be a commitment scheme, and let R ⊆ {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} n be a polynomial-time computable nonreflexive relation (i.e., R(v, v) = 0). As before we consider man-in-the-middle adversaries that are simultaneously participating in a left and a right interaction in which a commitment scheme is taking place. The adversary is said to succeed in mauling a left commitment to a value v, if he is able to come up with a right commitment to a valueṽ such that R(v,ṽ) = 1. Since we cannot rule out copying, we will only be interested in relations where copying is not considered success, and we therefore require that the relation R is non-reflexive. The man-in-the-middle and the stand-alone executions are defined as follows.
The man-in-the-middle execution. In the man-in-themiddle execution, the adversary A is simultaneously participating in a left and a right interaction. In the left interaction the man-in-the-middle adversary A interacts with C receiving a commitment to a value v. In the right interaction A interacts with R attempting to commit to a related valueṽ. Prior to the interaction, the value v is given to C as local input. A receives an auxiliary input z, which in particular might contain a-priori informantion about v. 1 The success of A is defined using the following two Boolean random variables:
• mim A com (R, v, z) = 1 if and only if A produces a valid committment toṽ such that R(v,ṽ) = 1.
• mim A open (R, v, z) = 1 if and only if A decommits to a valueṽ such that R(v,ṽ) = 1.
The stand-alone execution. In the stand-alone execution only one interaction takes place. The stand-alone adversary S directly interacts with R. As in the man-inthe-middle execution, the value v is chosen prior to the interaction and S receives some a-priori information about v as part of its an auxiliary input z. S first executes the commitment phase with R. Once the commitment phase has been completed, S receives the value v and attempts to decommit to a valueṽ. The success of S is defined using the following two Boolean random variables:
• sta S com (R, v, z) = 1 if and only if S produces a valid committment toṽ such that R(v,ṽ) = 1.
•
n × {0, 1} n , every v ∈ {0, 1} n , and every z ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that:
Non-malleability with respect to opening is defined in the same way, while replacing the random variables mim Content-based v.s. tag-based commitments. Similarly to the definition of interactive proofs non-malleable with respect to statements, the above definitions only require that the adversary should not be able to commit to a value that is related, but different, from the value it receives a commitment of. Technically, the above fact can be seen from the definitions by noting that the relation R, which defines the success of the adversary, is required to be non-reflexive. This means that the adversary is said to fail if it only is able to produce a commitment to the same value.
2 Indeed, if the same protocol is executed in the left and the right interaction, the adversary can always copy messages and succeed in committing to the same value on the right as it receives a commitment of, on the left. To cope with this problem, the definition can be extended to incorporate tags, in analogy with the definition of interactive proofs non-malleable with respect to tags. The extension is straight-forward and therefore omitted.
We note that any commitment scheme that satisfies Definition 2.2 can easily be transformed into a scheme which is tag-based non-malleable, by prepending the tag to the value before committing. Conversely, in analogy with nonmalleable interactive proof, commitment schemes that are non-malleable with respect to tags of length m(n) = poly(n) can be transformed into commitment schemes non-malleable with respect to content in a standard way (e.g., [11, 24] ).
Comparison with Previous Definitions
Our definitions of non-malleability essentially follow the original definitions by Dwork et al. [11] . However, whereas the definitions by Dwork et al. quantifies the experiments over all distributions D of inputs for the left and the right interaction (or just left interaction in the case of commitments), we instead quantify over all possible input values x,x (or, in the case of commitments over all possible input values v for the left interaction). Our definitions can thus be seen as non-uniform versions of the definitions of [11] .
Our definition of non-malleability with respect to opening is, however, different from the definition of [10] in the following ways: (1) The definition of [10] does not take into account possible a-priori information that the adversary might have about the commitment, while our (following [11] ) does.
(2) In our definition of the stand-alone execution the standalone adversary receives the value v after having completed the commitment phase and is thereafter supposed to decommit to a value related to v. The definition of [10] does not provide the simulator with this information.
In our view, the "a-priori information" requirement is essential in many situations and we therefore present a definition that satisfies it. (Consider, for example, a setting where the value v committed to is determined by a different protocol, which "leaks" some information about v.) In order to be able to satisfy this stronger requirement we relax the definition of [10] by allowing the stand-alone adversary to receive the value v before decommitting.
A NON-MALLEABLE ZK PROTOCOL
Our construction of non-malleable ZK protocols proceeds in two phases. In the first phase, we construct a small set of "atomic" ZK arguments that are non-malleable with respect to each other. These protocols can be viewed as being nonmalleable for tags of size O(log n), where n ∈ N is the size of the common input (security parameter). In the second phase, the atomic protocols are appropriately combined into a "full-fledged" non-malleable ZK protocol for tags of length n (which yields non-malleability w.r.t. statements).
The Atomic ZK Protocols
The basic building block for our construction is a set of m = poly(n) atomic protocols {ZKtag} m tag=1 . The protocols rely on Barak's non black-box techniques for obtaining constant-round public-coin ZK for N P [1] , and are essentially identical to the ZK protocols used by Pass in [29] (which in turn rely on the protocols by Pass and Rosen [30] ). In this work we actually prove that the atomic protocols satisfy a "weak" non-malleability property. This property is somewhat stronger than the property proved in [29] (which is "simulation-soundness"). We start by presenting the ideas underlying Barak's protocol. We then show how to extend Barak's techniques in order to obtain the atomic protocols.
Barak's non-black-box protocol. Let n ∈ N , and let T : N → N be a "nice" function that satisfies T (n) = n ω(1) . Barak's protocol relies on a "special" NTIME(T (n)) relation. It also makes use of a witness-indistinguishable universal argument (W IU ARG) [13, 12, 22, 25, 3] . We start by describing a variant of Barak's relation, which we denote by R sim . Usage of this variant will facilitate the presentation of our ideas in later stages. Let {Hn}n be a family of hash functions where a function h ∈ Hn maps {0, 1} * to {0, 1} n , and let Com be a statistically binding commitment scheme for strings of length n, where for any α ∈ {0, 1} n , the length of Com(α) is upper bounded by 2n. The relation R sim is described in Figure 2 .
Instance: A triplet h, c, r ∈ Hn × {0, 1} n × {0, 1} poly(n) .
Witness: A program Π ∈ {0, 1} * , a string y ∈ {0, 1} * and a string s ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) .
Relation: R Sim ( h, c, r , Π, y, s ) = 1 if and only if:
1. |y| ≤ |r| − n.
c = Com(h(Π); s).
3. Π(y) = r within T (n) steps. Let L be any language in N P, let n ∈ N , and let x ∈ {0, 1} n be the common input for the protocol. Barak's protocol is described in Figure 3 .
Common Input: An instance x ∈ {0, 1} n Security parameter: 1 n .
Stage 1:
V → P : Send h r ← Hn. P → V : Send c = Com(0 n ). V → P : Send r r ← {0, 1} 3n .
Stage 2 (Body of the proof ):
P ⇔ V : A WI UARG P UA , V UA proving the OR of the following two statements: As shown in [1] , BZK is computationally sound. We sketch why it is also ZK. Let V * be the program of a potentially malicious verifier. The ZK property of BZK follows by letting the simulator set Π = V * and y = c, where c = Com(h(V * ); s). Since |c| = 2n ≤ |r| − n and since, by definition V * (c) always equals r, the simulator can set c = Com(h(V * ); s) in Stage 1, and use the triplet V * , c, s as a witness for R sim in the W IU ARG.
3 This enables the simulator to produce convincing interactions, even without knowing a valid witness for x ∈ L. The ZK property then follows (with some work) from the hiding property of Com and the WI property of the W IU ARG.
The atomic protocols. The main difference between the atomic protocols and BZK is that in the atomic protocol the prover (simulator) is given two opportunities to guess the verifier's next message. Since the probability of guessing the verifier's next message in any one of the two opportunities is negligible, the soundness of the protocol will not be harmed. The simulation task, on the other hand, will be somewhat facilitated, since the simulator will get two opportunities to succeed in predicting the verifier's next message. What will 3 The usage of V * 's program as a witness for the W IU ARG is precisely what makes the simulation non black-box. differentiate between two atomic protocols ZKtag and ZKt ag is the fact that the length of the verifier's next messages in ZKtag is a parameter that depends on tag and m (as well as on the security parameter n).
Common Input: An instance x ∈ {0, 1} n Parameters: Security parameter 1 n , length parameter (n).
Stage 0 (Set-up):
Stage 1 (Slot 1):
Stage 1 (Slot 2):
P ⇔ V : A WI UARG P UA , V UA proving the OR of the following three statements: Stand-alone analysis of ZKtag. Using similar arguments to the ones used for BZK, it can be shown that ZKtag is sound. The main difference to be taken into consideration is the existence of multiple slots in Stage 1. 4 The ZK property is proved exactly as in the case of BZK, by letting the simulator pick either i = 1 or i = 2, and use V * , ci, si as the witness for h, ci, ri ∈ L sim (where L sim is the language that corresponds to R sim ). Since for every tag ∈ [m], |ri| − |ci| ≥ (n) − 2n, we have that as long as (n) ≥ 3n, the protocol ZKtag is indeed ZK.
Useful properties of the atomic protocols. We highlight some properties of the atomic protocols. These properties will turn out to be relevant when dealing with a man in the middle.
Freedom in the choice of the slot: The simulator described above has the freedom to choose which i ∈ {1, 2} it will use in order to satisfy the relation R sim . In particular, for the simulation to succeed, it is sufficient that h, ci, ri ∈ L sim for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Using a longer y in the simulation: The stand-alone analysis of ZKtag only requires (n) ≥ 3n. Allowing larger values of (n) gives us the possibility of using a longer y in the simulation. This will turn out to be useful in cases where the verifier is allowed to receive "outside" messages that do not belong to the protocol (as indeed occurs in the man-in-the-middle setting). 4 We mention that BZK and ZKtag are known to be sound only assuming that the family {H k }n is collision resistant against T (n)-sized circuits. Nevertheless, using ideas from [3] , it is possible to show how by slightly modifying the relation R sim , one can guarantee soundness under "standard" collision resistance.
Proof of knowledge: ZKtag is a proof of knowledge.
That is, for any prover P * and for any x ∈ {0, 1} n , if P * convinces the honest verifier V that x ∈ L with non-negligible probability then one can extract a witness w that satisfies RL(x, w) = 1 in (expected) polynomial time. 
"Weak" Non-Malleability of ZKtag
We consider man-in-the-middle (MIM) adversaries that are simultaneously involved in two different executions of ZKtag. For any tag,t ag ∈ {1, . . . , m} we consider a left interaction in which ZKtag is executed with common input x ∈ {0, 1} n , and a right interaction in which ZKt ag is executed with common inputx ∈ {0, 1} n . The witness used by the prover in the left interaction is denoted by w, and the auxiliary input used by the adversary is denoted by z.
Lemma 3.1. Let A be a MIM adversary as above, and suppose that tag =t ag. Further suppose that (n) ≥ 3n. Then, there exists a stand alone prover S for ZKt ag and a negligible function ν(·) so that:
Since m = poly(n) and tag ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the tag's are in fact strings of length log m = O(log n). Thus, Lemma 3.1 establishes some sort of "weak" non-malleability for the protocols in the family {ZKtag} m tag=1 .
Proof Sketch: The machine S will use a variant of the stand-alone ZK simulator in order to "internally" generate a view of a left ZKtag interaction for A. The messages sent by A in the right interaction will be forwarded by S to an "external" honest verifier V for ZKt ag whose replies will be then fed back to A. Since the view produced by the ZK simulator is indistinguishable from A's actual interactions with an honest left prover, the probability that S manages to convince V will be negligibly close to the probability that A produces a convincing right interaction.
The execution of S (with one specific scheduling of messages) is depicted in Figure 5 below. In order to differentiate between the left and right interactions, messages m in the right interaction are labelled asm. Stage 2 messages in the left and right interactions are denoted u andũ respectively.
The main hurdle in implementing S is in making the simulation of the left interaction work. The problem is that the actual code of the verifier whose view we are simulating is only partially available to S. This is because the messages sent by A in the left interaction also depend on the messages A receives in the right interaction. These messages are sent by an "external" V , and V 's code (randomness) is not available to S.
Technically speaking, the problem is implied by the fact that the values of the ri's do not necessarily depend only on the corresponding ci, but rather may also depend on the "external" right messagesri. Thus, setting Π = A and y = ci in the simulation will not be sufficient, since in some cases it is simply not true that ri = A(ci). 5 As a side remark, we mention that the weak proof of knowledge property of the W IU ARG is not sufficient for our purposes. To guarantee the "traditional" proof of knowledge property, we will have to make use of a "specialized" version of W IU ARGs (further details in the full version). Intuitively, the most difficult case to handle is the one in whichr1 is contained in Slot 1 of ZKtag andr2 is contained in Slot 2 of ZKtag (as in Figure 5 above). In this case ri = A(ci,ri) and so ri = A(ci) does not hold for either i ∈ {1, 2}. As a consequence, the simulator will not be able to produce views of convincing Stage 2 interactions with A. In order to overcome the difficulty, we will use the fact that for a given instance h, ci, ri , the string ci is short enough to be "augmented" byri while still satisfying the relation R sim .
Specifically, as long as |ci| + |ri| ≤ |ri| − n the relation R sim can be satisfied by setting y = (ci,ri). This guarantees that indeed Π(y) = ri. The crux of the argument lies in the following claim (proof omitted).
Claim 3.2. Suppose that tag =t ag. Then, there exists i ∈ {1, 2} so that |ri| ≤ |ri| − (n).
By setting y = (ci,ri) for the appropriate i, the simulator is thus always able to satisfy R sim for some i ∈ {1, 2}. This is because the "auxiliary" string y used in order to enable the prediction of ri is short enough to pass the inspection at Condition 1 of R sim (i.e., |y| = |ci| + |ri| ≤ |ri| − n).
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Once R sim can be satisfied, the simulator is able to produce views of convincing interactions that are computationally indistinguishable from real left interactions.
7
The success probability of S. The success of S relies on the fact that the view of an honest ZKt ag verifier in right interactions with A is indistinguishable from the view of the ZKt ag verifier in stand-alone interactions with S. Since the acceptance bit of the verifier is a polynomial-time computable function of its view, we have that any non-negligible gap between the success probabilities of A and S directly translates into a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing between the corresponding verifier views. Thus, S convinces the honest ZKt ag verifier with probability that is negligibly close to the probability that A convinces the honest ZKt ag right verifier.
"Many-to-One" Non-Malleability of ZKtag
We next consider what happens when a man-in-the-middle adversary is simultaneously involved in the verification of many different (parallel) executions of ZKtag on the left while proving a single interaction on the right. As it turns out, as long as the number of left executions is bounded in advance, we can actually guarantee non-malleability even in this (more demanding) scenario.
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For any tag 1 , . . . , tag n ,t ag ∈ {1, . . . , m} we consider a left interaction in which ZKtag 1 , . . . , ZKtag n are executed in parallel with common input x ∈ {0, 1} n , and a right interaction in which ZKt ag is executed with common inputx ∈ {0, 1} n . The witness used by the prover in the left interaction is denoted by w, and the auxiliary input used by the adversary is denoted by z.
Lemma 3.3. Let A be a MIM adversary as above, and suppose that tag j =t ag for all j ∈ [n]. Further suppose that (n) ≥ 2n 2 + n. Then, there exists a stand alone prover S for ZKt ag and a negligible function ν(·) so that:
Proof: We construct a stand-alone ZKt ag prover S for the statement "x ∈ L". As in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we employ a simulation procedure in order to "internally" generate a left view of ZKtag 1 , . . . , ZKtag m for A while forwarding messages from the right interaction to an "external" honest verifier. The specific way in which messages are handled is somewhat different than in the case of Lemma 3.1.
Right interaction:
Messages that belong to ZKt ag are forwarded by S to an "external" honest verifier V for ZKt ag . V 's replies are then fed back to A.
Left interaction:
The left interaction messages are generated by n "sub-simulators" S1, . . . , Sn, where each Sj is responsible for generating the messages of the sub-protocol ZKtag j . The strategy of each of the Sj's is essentially identical to the simulator used by the simulator from Lemma 3.1. The key differences between the two strategies are:
• The program Aj to which Sj commits in Slot i acts exactly like A, but instead of outputting r As before, the most difficult case to handle is whenr1 is contained in Slot 1 of ZKtag j andr2 is contained in Slot 2 of ZKtag j . We start by observing that in such a case for both i ∈ {1, 2} and all j ∈ [n], if Sj sets y = (c Now, since tag j =t ag (by Hypothesis) we can invoke Claim 3.2 and infer that there exists i ∈ {1, 2} so that |ri| ≤ |r j i | − (n). This means that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} 8 This is a special case of the bounded concurrency scenario considered in [23, 30, 29] . Since the current scenario is simpler than the [29] one, we are actually able to give a simpler, self-contained, proof. the simulator Sj can choose an i ∈ {1, 2} so that:
Since by Hypothesis (n) ≥ 2n 2 +n we get that |y| ≤ |r j i |−n and so Sj will always succeed in the simulation. 
"Full-Fledged" Non-Malleable ZK
We now show how to combine the atomic protocols in order to construct a "full-fledged" non-malleable ZK protocol nmZKtag. As before, we consider adversaries that are simultaneously involved in two different executions of the protocol. This time however, the tags can be arbitrary strings in {0, 1}
n . This in particular allows the usage of the statement x ∈ {0, 1} n that is being proved as the tag string, yielding a construction of a ZK argument system that is non-malleable with respect to statements. Protocol nmZKtag is described in Figure 7 .
Tag String: tag ∈ {0, 1} n . Let tag = tag 1 , . . . , tagn.
The protocol:
Run ZK (i, tag i ) with common input x and length parameter (n).
V : Accept if and only if all runs are accepting. Notice that nmZKtag has a constant number of rounds (since each ZK (i, tag i ) is constant-round). Also notice that for i ∈ [n], the length of the tag (i, tagi) is |i| + |tagi| = log n + 1 = log 2n
Viewing (i, tagi) as elements in [2n] (i.e. m = 2n) we infer that the length of verifier messages in ZK (i, tag i ) is upper bounded by m (n) = 2n (n). Hence, as long as (n) = poly(n) the length of verifier messages in nmZKtag is upper bounded by n · m (n) = 2n 2 (n) = poly(n).
9 The messagesh1, . . . ,hn andũ1, . . . ,ũn can be handled by setting (n) ≥ 3n 2 + n, and by appending them to y.
Non-Malleability of nmZK
Let tag,t ag ∈ {0, 1} m , let x,x ∈ {0, 1} n , and let A be the corresponding MIM adversary. We consider a left interaction in which nmZKtag is executed with common input x ∈ {0, 1} n , and a right interaction in which nmZKt ag is executed with common inputx ∈ {0, 1} n . The witness used by the prover in the left interaction is denoted by w, and the auxiliary input used by the adversary is denoted by z.
Lemma 3.4. Let A be a MIM adversary as above, and suppose that tag =t ag and that (n) ≥ 2n 2 + n. Then, there exists a stand alone prover S for nmZKt ag and a negligible function ν(·) so that:
The construction of the prover S proceeds in two phases. In the first phase, the adversary A is used in order to construct a stand-alone prover S for one of the sub-protocols ZK (i,t ag i ) , where i ∈ [n] is such that tagi =t agi. This S is a prover for the statement "x ∈ L" and will have success probability negligibly close to the success probability of A.
In the second phase, the proof of knowledge property of ZK (i,t ag i ) is used in order to extract an N P-witness w for the statement "x ∈ L" from S. Once the witness w forx is extracted, it is possible to produce convincing (stand-alone) interactions for the full protocol nmZKt ag by playing the honest prover strategy and using w as witness for "x ∈ L".
Since S convinces an honest V with probability that is negligibly close to the success probability of A, and since the proof of knowledge property guarantees extraction with probability that is negligibly close to the convincing probability of S, the overall success probability of S is negligibly close to the success probability of A.
Constructing the stand alone prover S. Implementing the second phase is a fairly standard task. We thus focus on the first phase. Let i ∈ [n] so that tagi =t agi. In order to construct a stand-alone ZK (i,t ag i ) prover S for the statement "x ∈ L", we use A in order to construct a "manyto-one" man-in-the-middle adversary Ai. This Ai verifies that x ∈ L using ZK (1, tag 1 ) , . . . , ZK (n, tagn) on the left, and proves thatx ∈ L using ZK (i,t ag i ) on the right. Ai has the same success probability as A.
Notice that for every j ∈ [n], it holds that (j, tagj) = (i,tagi) (since either j = i or tagi =tagi). Thus, the tags (j, tagj) used in the left interaction of Ai are all different than the tag (i,t agi) used by Ai in the right interaction. This means that, once we establish the existence of a "manyto-one" MIM Ai as above, we can invoke Lemma 3.3 to obtain a stand alone prover S that has the same success probability as A, and thus complete the proof of Lemma 3.4.
Constructing the "many-to-one" adversary Ai. The adversary Ai invokes A as a subroutine. It feeds A with messages in the following way (see Figure 8 , where messages from circled sub-protocols are forwarded externally).
Right interaction: Messages that belong to ZK (i,t ag i ) are forwarded to an "external" honest verifier V for ZK (i,t ag i ) . V 's replies are then fed back to A. Messages that belong to {ZK (j,t ag j ) } j =i are handled "internally". Specifically, Ai plays the role of the honest ZK (j,t ag j ) verifier in each of the right-interaction sub-protocols by feeding A with randomly chosen verifier messagesr j 1 ,r j 2 and by verifying that the subprotocol is accepting. Figure 8 : The "Many-to-one" MIM adversary Ai.
Left interaction: The left interaction messages are all forwarded to an "external" left prover P for the sessions ZK (1, tag 1 ) , . . . , ZK (n, tagn) . P 's replies are fed back to A.
It can be seen that A's view of left and right hand side messages (as generated by Ai) is distributed exactly as the messages it obtains in real executions. Thus, the success probability of Ai is at least as high as that of A.
NON-MALLEABLE COMMITMENTS
Using the construction of nmZKtag as a subroutine, we present a simple construction of non-malleable commitments. We focus on (statistically-binding) commitments that are non-malleable w.r.t. commitment. At the end of this section we outline the construction of statistically-hiding commitments that are non-malleable w.r.t. opening.
Let Com be a statistically binding commitment scheme (for simplicity, assume that Com is non-interactive). Consider the following protocol for non-malleable commitments.
Security Parameter: 1 k .
String to be committed to: v ∈ {0, 1} k .
Commit Phase:
C → R: Pick s ∈ {0, 1} n and send c = Com(v; s). C ↔ R: Prove using nmZKc that there exist v, s ∈ {0, 1} k so that c = Com(v; s).
R: Verify that nmZKc is accepting.
Reveal Phase:
C → R: Send v, s.
R: Verify that c = Com(v; s). The statistical binding property of nmC follows from the statistical binding of Com. The computational hiding property follows from the computational hiding of Com, as well as from the (stand alone) ZK property of nmZKc. Consider now a man-in-the-middle adversary A that, given access to a left interaction in which v is committed to, succeeds in committing to a valueṽ = v that satisfies R(v,ṽ) = 1. To prove non-malleability, one needs to construct a stand-alone committer S, that manages to commit toṽ with essentially the same probability as A.
The high-level idea is to view A as a man in the middle adversary A for the protocol nmZKc, where the statement x proved in the left interaction equals c = Com (v) and the statementx proved in the right interaction equals c = Com(ṽ). By definition of non-malleable zero-knowledge, there exists a stand-alone prover S that obtains c as input and produces convincing nmZKc interactions.
Notice that the stand-alone committer for nmC, that we are supposed to construct does not have access to c. To get around this problem we let the stand-alone committer invoke S on input c = Com(0 k ) (rather than on input c = Com(v)). Since the commitment Com is hiding, it will then follow that the statementc = Com(ṽ) that S proves on the right will still satisfy R(v,ṽ) = 1.
Due to a subtle technical issue the above idea does not work. The reason for this is that the man in the middle adversary A might choose the statementc to be proved on the right (and thus the value committed to) adaptively. In fact, we need to make sure that the actual values committed by the stand-alone committer are indistinguishable from the values committed to by A. Note that it is not sufficient to only require that the statements proved are indistinguishable, since the statements are just commitment to these values, and commitments are always indistinguishable! We hint that we solve this problem by resorting to a statistical ZK version of our non-malleable ZK protocol. By doing this, we can instead show that the statements proved are statistically indistinguishable (which thus implies that the actual values committed to are indistinguishable).
Statistically Hiding Commitments. We outline the construction of statistically hiding commitments that are non-malleable with respect to opening. The protocol proceeds as follows: In the commit phase, the committer simply send a (possibly malleable) statistically hiding commitment c = Com(v; s) to the receiver. In the reveal phase, the committer sends the value v and additionally gives a non-malleable ZK proof of knowledge of a value s such that c = Com(v; s ). We note that, somewhat ironically, in the above construction it is actually sufficient to use a non-malleable proof of knowledge that is computational ZK (whereas in the construction of statistically binding commitments we rely on a statistical ZK protocol).
